

# Keyword Search on Encrypted Data

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Motivation	Results
<p>Secure Integration of Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) and Public Key Encryption (PKE)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ A formal model of PEKS/PKE</li> <li>❖ A simple, generic construction of PEKS/PKE based on tag-KEM/DEM</li> <li>❖ Some interesting applications/extensions</li> </ul>

Integration of PEKS and PKE	Security of the Integrated System
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ Ciphertexts are produced with specific keywords</li> <li>❖ <u>Example</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Routing on encrypted emails           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➢ Encrypted Email = tag    encrypted mail body</li> <li>➢ A mail gateway (with trapdoor <math>td_w</math> produced by the Receiver) can test whether “tag” contains information of <math>w</math></li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➢ PEKS + PKE           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➔ Individually secure components may NOT result in a secure system!</li> <li>➔ E.g.: Data privacy may not hold if chosen ciphertext attack is considered. (Pointed out by [BSS06])</li> </ul> </li> <li>➢ <u>Security Notions</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Data privacy               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Semantic security against adaptive chosen ciphertext and chosen keyword attack</li> </ul> </li> <li>✓ Keyword Privacy               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertext and chosen keyword attack</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul>

The Proposed Scheme							
<table border="1"> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;"> <math display="block">\text{Kg}(1^k)</math> <math display="block">(pk_1, sk_1) \leftarrow \text{PEKSkG}(1^k);</math> <math display="block">(pk_2, sk_2) \leftarrow \text{TKkg}(1^k);</math> <math display="block">pk = (pk_1, pk_2);</math> <math display="block">sk = (sk_1, sk_2);</math> <math display="block">\text{return } (pk, sk);</math> </td> <td style="padding: 5px;"> <math display="block">\text{Dec}(sk, c)</math> <math display="block">sk = (sk_1, sk_2);</math> <math display="block">c = (\tau, \psi, \chi);</math> <math display="block">dk \leftarrow \text{TKdec}(sk_2, \psi, \tau    \chi);</math> <math display="block">m \leftarrow \text{DEMdec}(dk, \chi);</math> <math display="block">\text{return } m;</math> </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;"> <math display="block">\text{Enc}(pk, w, m)</math> <math display="block">pk = (pk_1, pk_2);</math> <math display="block">\tau \leftarrow \text{PEKSenc}(pk_1, w);</math> <math display="block">(dk, \eta) \leftarrow \text{TKkey}(pk_2);</math> <math display="block">\chi \leftarrow \text{DEMenc}(dk, m);</math> <math display="block">\lambda \leftarrow (\tau    \chi);</math> <math display="block">\psi \leftarrow \text{TKenc}(\eta, \lambda);</math> <math display="block">c \leftarrow (\tau, \psi, \chi);</math> <math display="block">\text{return } c;</math> </td> <td style="padding: 5px;"> <math display="block">\text{Td}(sk, w)</math> <math display="block">sk = (sk_1, sk_2);</math> <math display="block">t_w \leftarrow \text{PEKStd}(sk_1, w);</math> <math display="block">\text{return } t_w;</math> </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 5px;"></td> <td style="padding: 5px;"> <math display="block">\text{Test}(t_w, c)</math> <math display="block">c = (\tau, \psi, \chi);</math> <math display="block">b \leftarrow \text{PEKStest}(t_w, \tau);</math> <math display="block">\text{return } b;</math> </td> </tr> </table>	$\text{Kg}(1^k)$ $(pk_1, sk_1) \leftarrow \text{PEKSkG}(1^k);$ $(pk_2, sk_2) \leftarrow \text{TKkg}(1^k);$ $pk = (pk_1, pk_2);$ $sk = (sk_1, sk_2);$ $\text{return } (pk, sk);$	$\text{Dec}(sk, c)$ $sk = (sk_1, sk_2);$ $c = (\tau, \psi, \chi);$ $dk \leftarrow \text{TKdec}(sk_2, \psi, \tau    \chi);$ $m \leftarrow \text{DEMdec}(dk, \chi);$ $\text{return } m;$	$\text{Enc}(pk, w, m)$ $pk = (pk_1, pk_2);$ $\tau \leftarrow \text{PEKSenc}(pk_1, w);$ $(dk, \eta) \leftarrow \text{TKkey}(pk_2);$ $\chi \leftarrow \text{DEMenc}(dk, m);$ $\lambda \leftarrow (\tau    \chi);$ $\psi \leftarrow \text{TKenc}(\eta, \lambda);$ $c \leftarrow (\tau, \psi, \chi);$ $\text{return } c;$	$\text{Td}(sk, w)$ $sk = (sk_1, sk_2);$ $t_w \leftarrow \text{PEKStd}(sk_1, w);$ $\text{return } t_w;$		$\text{Test}(t_w, c)$ $c = (\tau, \psi, \chi);$ $b \leftarrow \text{PEKStest}(t_w, \tau);$ $\text{return } b;$	<p><u>Construction Idea:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>❖ Anonymous IBE + tag-KEM/DEM</li> <li>❖ Well understood and standard components)</li> </ul> <p><u>Applications and Extensions:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Efficient Instantiation with Gentry-PEKS and KD-PKE</li> <li>✓ Threshold decryption</li> <li>✓ Hierarchical Keywords</li> </ul>
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For each algorithm of PEKS/PKE, we require it should terminate and return “⊥” (denoting “abnormal termination”), if any of its sub-algorithms terminates abnormally.

Fig. 1. Generic Construction of PEKS/PKE