

REVOCATION SCHEME FOR ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION

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For RCIS Workshop Talk 2008.05.16

What is Attribute-based Encryption?

Public-key Encryption

1976

Encrypt using
public key



ID-based Encryption (IBE)

1984, 2001

Encrypt using **ID** (e.g., email
address) as public key

Can be decrypted using private
key of that ID



Attribute-based Encryption (ABE)

2005

Encrypt using **access
control policy** as public key

Can be decrypted if **user
attributes satisfy the policy**

Hot topic in crypto research community


In this talk, we will

- ▶ Give a short survey on ABE
- ▶ Present our revocation scheme for ABE

Outline of Talk


- * Motivating problem: Secure Remote File Storage
- * Introducing Attribute-based Encryption (ABE)
- * Motivation for revocable ABE
- * Our solution: Broadcast-conjunctive ABE
- * Constructions

A Challenge for Ubiquitous Society: Remote File Storage



- *Scalability
- *Reliability
- *Security

Security Solution 1 (not so nice): Access Control via Trust Server



Security Solution 2 (not so nice): Security via Encryption



Good:

- ★ No need of trust server
- ★ Encryption ensures security

Bad:


- * Must be online to distribute keys (1key/1file) or
- * Fine-grained access control not possible (1key/many files)

List of Wanted Properties



☒ Possible offline trusted party

☒ Files are encrypted



☒ No online key distribution

☒ Universal public key



☒ Untrusted storage




Access control policy

☒ Flexible fine-grained access control


Ciphertext–Policy ABE: Concept

- * Private key assigned to “attributes”
- * Ciphertext associated with “access policy”
- * Can decrypt only when attributes satisfy policy

Ciphertext-Policy ABE



Security Against Collusion Attack




- * Users should not be able to combine their keys
- * Main security point for ABE
- * Multiple encryption does not give secure ABE.

Another type of ABE Key-Policy ABE

Role of attributes and policy swapped

- * Private key assigned to “access policy”
- * Ciphertext associated with “attributes”
- * Can decrypt only when attributes satisfy policy

Key-Policy ABE



Previous Works

CP-ABE

KP-ABE

Only single threshold gate (Fuzzy IBE)

Sahai, Waters Eurocrypt05

Any monotone formulae

Goyal, Pandey, Sahai, Waters ACM-CCS06


Any monotone formulae

Bethencourt, Sahai, Waters IEEE S&P07

Any formulae

Ostrovsky, Sahai, Waters ACM-CCS07

Next Challenge (Our Focus Here): To Revoke Leaked Keys



Importance of Revocation Scheme



- * Without it, no security control ensured
- * Failure of copy protection for copyrighted DVD distribution



- * With revocation scheme, we have a countermeasure against piracy
- * In next-generation disc (**Blu-ray**), revocation scheme is enabled by **Broadcast Encryption** (BE)

Previous Revocation Solution for ABE

- * For Ciphertext-policy ABE, [Ostrovsky et al. 2007] scheme can be applied.
- * Using the idea of negative attributes
- * But **not so efficient**
- * For Key-Policy ABE, no solution yet so far.

We propose **efficient revocation**
mechanism for ABE

Use new primitive:
Broadcast-conjunctive ABE

Our Contributions

	Revocable CP-ABE	Revocable KP-ABE
Previous	[OSW07] $ Cipher = (2t+2) + r$ $ Key = (2m+2) \cdot (\log m)$	None
This work	$ Cipher = (2t+2) + 1$ $ Key = (2m+2) + 1$	$ Cipher = (m+2) + 1$ $ Key = 2t$


$r = |\text{revoked users}|$, $m = \max |\text{attribute set}|$, $t = |\text{leaves in tree}|$

Our Contributions


	Revocable CP-ABE	Revocable KP-ABE
Previous	[OSW07] $ Cipher = [BSW07] + r$ $ Key = [BSW07] \cdot (\log m)$	None
This work	$ Cipher = [BSW07] + 1$ $ Key = [BSW07] + 1$	$ Cipher = [GPSW07] + 1$ $ Key = [GPSW07]$

$r = |\text{revoked users}|$, $m = \max |\text{attribute set}|$

Broadcast-Conjunctive KP-ABE




Broadcast-Conjunctive CP-ABE




Misguided Approach 1: Double Encryption of BE&ABE

Vulnerable to “Collusion attack”




Misguided Approach 2: Include All Negative Attributes



Our approach can embed a
“set” in one attribute

Special Case: Broadcast Fuzzy IBE

Decryptable when
 $|\omega \cap \psi| \geq \text{threshold}$.



Construction (1/2)

Setup(n, d): Let $\mathbb{G}$ be a bilinear group of prime order p with bilinear map $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$. $n = |\text{users}|$, $d + 1 = \text{thres}$.

Let $g \leftarrow \mathbb{G}$ and $\alpha, \gamma, p_1, \dots, p_d, f_1, \dots, f_d \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$.

Let $g_i = g^{(\alpha^i)}$, $v = g^\gamma$, $h_j = g_n^{p_j} g^{f_j}$.

$$\text{pk} = \left(g, \underbrace{g_1, \dots, g_n, g_{n+2}, \dots, g_{2n}}_{BE}, \underbrace{h_1, \dots, h_d}_{ABE} \right) \in \mathbb{G}^{2n+d+1}.$$

Define $p(x) = p_d x^d + \dots p_1 x + p_0$, $f(x) = f_d x^d + \dots f_1 x + f_0$

Define $F : \mathbb{Z}_p \rightarrow \mathbb{G}$ by $F(x) = g_n^{p(x)} g^{f(x)} = \prod_{j=1}^d h_j^{x^j}$.

Extract(i, ω): Given $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ and set ω of attributes.

For $j \in \omega$, choose $r_j \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$.

Choose random poly $q(x)$ of degree d with $q(0) = \alpha^i$.

$$d_{i,\omega} = \left(\underbrace{g^{(\gamma \cdot q(j))} \cdot F(j)^{r_j}}_{BE \otimes ABE}, \underbrace{g^{r_j}}_{ABE} \mid j \in \omega \right) \in \mathbb{G}^{2|\omega|}.$$

Construction (2/2)

Encrypt(pk, R, ω'): Choose $t \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. Set KEM-key $K = e(g_n, g_1)^t$. Set

$$\text{Hdr} = \left(g^t, \underbrace{\left(v \cdot \prod_{k \in \mathcal{U} \setminus R} g_{n+1-k} \right)^t}_{BE}, \underbrace{\left(F(j)^t \mid j \in \omega' \right)}_{ABE} \right)$$

$\in \mathbb{G}^{|\omega'|+2}$ as a header.

Decrypt(pk, $i, \omega, d_{i,\omega}, R, \omega', \text{Hdr}$): Decryptable if $|\omega \cap \omega'| \geq d + 1$. Choose $T \in \omega \cap \omega'$ that $|T| = d + 1$. Parse $d_{i,\omega} = (a_j, b_j \mid j \in \omega)$, $\text{Hdr} = (C_0, C_1, (A_j \mid j \in \omega'))$. Compute

$$K = \frac{e(g_i, C_1)}{e\left(\prod_{\substack{k \in \mathcal{U} \setminus R \\ k \neq i}} g_{n+1-k+i}, C_0\right)} \cdot \prod_{j \in T} \left(\frac{e(A_j, b_j)}{e(a_j, C_0)} \right)^{\Delta_{j,T}(0)}.$$

where $\Delta_{j,T}(x) = \prod_{\substack{k \in T \\ k \neq j}} \frac{(x-k)}{(j-k)}$ (Lagrange Interpolation Coef).

- Here, we formulate as KEM. In usage, ciphertext is $\text{Hdr} \parallel \text{Enc}_K(\text{Msg})$.

Results

	Revocable CP-ABE	Revocable KP-ABE
Previous	$[OSW07]$ $ Cipher = [BSW07] + r$ $ Key = [BSW07] \cdot (\log m)$	None
This work	$ Cipher = [BSW07] + 1$ $ Key = [BSW07] + 1$	$ Cipher = [GPSW07] + 1$ $ Key = [GPSW07]$

* Selective security in the standard model under Decision BDHE assumption [BGW05].

* Drawback: large public key (as in [BGW05]–BE). But can be reused for all instances.

Conclusions

- * Attribute-based encryption can be used as a flexible access control tool over encrypted data
- * Applications: Secure remote file sharing, Flexible Pay-TV system, etc.
- * For **Key-policy** ABE, we propose the **first** revocable scheme ever.
- * For **Ciphertext-policy** ABE, we propose a revocable scheme which is much more **efficient** than [OSW07].

Thank you!

Disclaimer: This presentation was originally created using Apple iWork'08 Keynote and then converted to PDF. The font and some structures may seem strange.