


Fast and Provably Secure Public Key Authentication for RFID Tags

Bagus Santoso

RFID System



Main Challenge: Resource vs. Security

Security Challenges:

- * Impersonation, cloning, tracking & tracing, corruption DoS, side channel, etc.

Need public key for high security & privacy

(Vaudenay, ASIACRYPT 2007)

But : public key cryptography is **very expensive**, while....


Resource of RFID Tag:

- * very small memory (~ 2 kb), very small circuit (~ 4k), very small power supply

This Research's Target: Fast Tag Authentication Secure against Active Impersonation

Applications:

- * mass transit systems (subway, ETC)
- * fast genuineness checking (mass anti-piracy system)



Basic Scheme (Schnorr)



Too much Mask

Too Heavy for RFID Tag

No secret leakage

Girault-Poupard-Stern

$$y = r + cs \pmod q \rightarrow y = r + cs$$

(WITHOUT Modulus
No Mask AT ALL)

Very light

Secret may leak

Need very large r

Need very large memory

Too Open

Our New Scheme

Smart Masking

- set r in $[0, A-1]$, c in $[0, B-1]$, and s in $[0, S-1]$ such that $A \pmod q = 0$, $BS < A$.
- in response, if $(r+cs) \geq A$, then $y = r+cs-A$, otherwise, $y = r+cs$.

Light enough for Tag

No secret leakage

No need very large r

No need very large memory

Performance Estimation on UMC 18nm 16-bit 100kHz w/ 80-bit offline security, 35 bit online security

	Gates (4.01 ms response calc.)	Memory Cost /use	Online Communication Cost	Total Response Time (1642 gates, 40kbps)
AES	3595	—	—	10.16 ms
Schnorr	5294 <small>too big for RFID Tag</small>	320 bits	160 bits	16.93 ms
GPS	1642	435 bits	275 bits	10.89 ms
New Scheme	1970	355 bits	195 bits	9.65 ms

Bagus Santoso, Kazuo Ohta, Kazuo Sakiyama, and Goichiro Hanaoka, "Improving Efficiency of An 'On the Fly' Identification Scheme by Perfecting Zero-Knowledgeness," In Proc. CT-RSA'10, LNCS 5985, Springer-Verlag, pp.284-301, March 2010.