What can cryptography do for coding theory?

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
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ICITS 2009


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Two classic channel models



- Alice sends n bits
- Binary symmetric channel BSC_P
 - Flips each bit with probability p
 - > Shannon: maximum possible rate is I-H(p)
 - Forney: concatenated codes achieve capacity efficiently
- Worst-case (adversarial) errors ADV_P
 - > Channel outputs an arbitrary word within distance pn of input
 - Optimal rate still unknown

Known Bounds




Why care about worst-case errors?

Combinatorial interest

> key building block for designs, authentication schemes, etc


Modeling unknown or varying channels

Codes designed for one channel may fail if model wrong
 E.g., concatenated codes do badly against bursty errors



This talk: cryptographic tools in coding

- Models of uncertain binary channels
 - > strong enough to capture wide variety of channel behavior
 - But reliable communication at Shannon capacity
- Theme: cryptographic perspective
 - > modeling "limited" adversarial behavior
 - simpler existence proofs
 - techniques for efficient constructions: indistinguishability, pseudorandomness



• Two kinds of models:

shared secrets for Alice and Bob


 \succ limited channels

- Two basic techniques
 - Sieving list decodable codes
 - > "Scrambling" (randomizing) adversarial errors

- Developing tools: shared secrets
- Computationally limited channels
- Recent results:
 - > Explicit constructions for worst-case "additive" errors [GS'09]
 - Efficient list-decoding for logspace channels [forthcoming]

Shared Randomness

Shared Randomness



• Encoder/decoder share random bits s

code is known to channel but s is unknown

• **Theorem I** [Langberg '04, ?]: With r=O(log n) shared bits, Alice can send \approx n(I-H(p)) bits reliably over Adv_p.


> (not necessarily computationally efficient)

• A simple "cryptographic" proof


> Tools: list-decoding, message authentication

Tool: List-decodable codes

- A code LDC: {0,1}^k → {0,1}ⁿ is
 (pn,L) list-decodable code if
 - Every vector in {0,1}ⁿ is within distance pn of at most L codewords




• With LDC, Bob gets a list of L possible codewords




• **Proposition** [Elias]: There exist (pn,L) list-decodable codes with rate $I-H(p)-\epsilon$ and list size $L = I/\epsilon$.

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
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• **Proposition** [Elias]: There exist (pn,L) list-decodable codes with rate $I-H(p)-\epsilon$ and list size $L = I/\epsilon$.

How can Bob figure out which is the right codeword?

Sieving the List



- Idea: Alice authenticates m using s as key
- **Theorem I** [Langberg '04, ?]: With r=O(log n) shared bits, Alice can send \approx n(I-H(p)) bits reliably over Adv_p.
- **Proof:** If MAC has forgery probability δ , then Bob corrects Adv_p errors with probability $\leq L \delta$

> Adversary gets at most L chances to forge

> MAC tag can have tag/key length O(log n)


Computational Efficiency?

- Problem with list-decoding: **efficient** constructions only known for $p \approx 0$ and $p \approx 1/2$
 - for other values of p, efficient constructions have rate well below capacity



Theorem 2 [Lipton'94]: With r ≈ n log(n) shared bits,
 Alice can Bob can efficiently and reliably communicate
 ≈n(I-H(p)) bits over Adv_p

Technique #2: Code Scrambling



Shared randomness to permute errors randomly


> Code REC corrects random errors with rate I-H(p) [Forney]

 \succ s=(π , Δ) where π is a random permutation of {1,...,n}

and Δ is a random offset in $\{0, I\}^n$

> Encoding: $c = \pi^{-1}(REC(m)) + \Delta$

Technique #2: Code Scrambling



- **Theorem 2** [Lipton]: Scrambled code corrects pn adversarial errors with rate \approx I-H(p)
- **Proof**: Δ acts as one-time pad


 \succ e is independent of π

 $\geq \pi(e)$ is a uniformly random vector of same weight as e (< pn)

Computational Efficiency w/ Short Keys?

- Code scrambling uses a long key: log(n!) + n bits
- **Open Question:** Can we get efficient codes of rate n(I-H(p)) that correct pn errors with keys of o(n) bits?
- **Partial Answer**: n+o(n) bits of key suffice
 - $ightarrow \pi$ just has to random enough to "fool" the REC decoder
 - Lemma [S'07]: Concatenated codes corrected log(n)-wise independent errors up to Shannon capacity
 - $\succ \pi$ only has to be a log(n)-wise independent permutation
 - > **Lemma** [KNR'05]: $\log^2(n)$ bits suffice to select π
 - > Get keys of length n + $log^{2}(n)$... bottleneck is one-time pad!

Shared Randomness



• Can correct adversarial errors up to Shannon capacity

Two techniques: sieving list and code scrambling

Scheme	Key length	Efficient?
Sieving list	log(n)	No*
Scrambling	n log(n)	Yes
Scrambling with t-wise π	n + log²(n)	Yes

Limited Channels

Limited channels

- Idea: consider adversarial yet limited class of channels
 > processes in nature may vary in strange ways
 but they are computationally simple
- Polynomial-time channels [Lipton]

Can strengthen results for shared randomness model
 Models with no setup?

• Additive channels [A,CN]

> Model noise that is oblivious to individual bits


Explicit, poly-time constructions

Polynomial-time Adversaries

Shared key setting [Lipton]

> Use a p.r.g. to do code scrambling with a short seed

Get O(log n)-bit keys and efficient decoding (assuming OWF)




Polynomial-time Adversaries

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> Use a p.r.g. to do code scrambling with a short seed

Get O(log n)-bit keys and efficient decoding (assuming OWF)



Public key setting [Micali, Peikert, Sudan, Wilson]

> Alice broadcasts a public key; keeps a secret key

> Replace MAC with signatures in list-sieving

$$\underset{m_{L}, t_{L} \rightarrow V}{\text{Sign}} \xrightarrow{t} \text{LDC} \xrightarrow{\text{Noisy channel}} \text{Dec} \begin{cases} \underset{m_{L}, t_{L} \rightarrow V}{m_{2}, t_{2} \rightarrow V} \rightarrow m \\ \vdots \\ m_{L}, t_{L} \rightarrow V \end{cases} \rightarrow m \end{cases}$$

What about models without setup?


- Nothing (significant) is known regarding polynomial time
 - Some bounds clearly apply (e.g. Shannon bound)
 - Unclear if one can beat information-theoretic bounds for adversarial channels

• Different extreme: additive channels

> very simple channels

> error pattern is adversarial, but independent of codeword

Worst-case additive errors



- Adversary picks error pattern e of weight < pn
 before seeing codeword
 - Adversary knows code and message


> Alice generates local random bits *r* (unknown to Bob/channel)

• Generalizes natural symmetric error models

> e.g., BSC, burst errors

- Natural step towards general classes of functions
- Special case of state-constrained AVC [Csiszár-Narayan]

Worst-case additive errors



- AVC's literature has general upper/lower bounds
- Theorem [Csiszár-Narayan, Langberg]: There exist codes with rate ≈ I-H(p) that correct pn additive errors.

Complex random coding arguments

- [Guruswami-S., '09]: This talk
 - Simpler existence proof via sieving LDC's
 - > Explicit construction with efficient encoding / decoding

Tool: Algebraic Manipulation Detection [CDFPW'08]

- "Error detection" for additive errors
- Randomized encoding AMD: $m \mapsto AMD(m,r)$

> Verify(AMD(m,r)) = I always

For all fixed error patterns e, w.h.p. over r, Verify(AMD(m,r)+e)=false

- Simple construction expands m by O(log(n)) bits
 - Use m to choose coefficients of low-degree polynomial fm

> AMD(m,r) = (m, r, f_m(r))

Lemma [DKRS]: If we ensure that the leading coefficients of fm have the right form, then for all m and for all offsets a,b,c: Pr(fm+a(r+b)= fm(r)+c) is small

Good codes for additive errors [GS'09]

• Use AMD scheme to sieve list of linear LDC



- This corrects as many errors as LDC
 - > For any string x, Dec(LDC(x)+e) = {x, x+e₂, ... x+e_L}
 - \succ Since LDC is linear, errors e₂, ..., e_L independent of x

> AMD rejects all non-zero errors w.h.p.

- **Lemma** [Guruswami-Hastad-Sudan-Zuckerman]: There exist linear LDC with rate $I-H(p)-\epsilon$ and list size $O(1/\epsilon)$.
- Consequence: additive errors codes w. rate I-H(p) exist


Efficient Constructions

- List-decoding construction not efficient in general
 Would like to get to capacity for all error rates p
- Idea:
 - bootstrap from "small" code (decodable by brute force) to "big code" (decodable efficiently)
 - Standard tool: concatenation [Forney]
 - Use big code over large alphabet + small code to encode symbols
 - Concatenation works poorly for worst-case errors
 - Adversary can concentrate errors in blocks (e.g. bursts)

Instead: use small code to share secret key for scrambling

• Interleave small code blocks into big code blocks pseudorandomly


- Two main pieces
 - > Scrambled "payload codeword": $\pi^{-1}(REC(m)) + \Delta$
 - π is a log²(n)-wise independent permutation,
 - Δ is a log²(n)-wise independent bit string



• Two main pieces

> Scrambled "payload codeword": $\pi^{-1}(REC(m)) + \Delta$

- Two main pieces
 - > Scrambled "payload codeword": $\pi^{-1}(REC(m)) + \Delta$
 - \succ "Control information": $\omega = (\pi, \Delta, T)$
 - T is a set of blocks in {1,..., n/log(n)}
 - ω is encoded using Reed-Solomon-code into "control blocks"
 - Each control block encoded using small LDC+AMD code




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Two main pieces


> Scrambled "payload codeword": $\pi^{-1}(REC(m)) + \Delta$

 \succ "Control information": $\omega = (\pi, \Delta, T)$

Combine by interleaving according to T



- Decoding idea
 - First decode control information, block by block
 - > Given control information, unpermute scrambled code



- Developing tools: shared secrets
- Computationally limited channels
- Recent results:
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 - Efficient list-decoding for logspace channels [forthcoming]

Logspace channels

Additive channels natural but maybe too limited

> What if channel **sets** bits to 0/1?

 \succ Flips 0 to 1 more often than 1 to 0?

- Limited-memory channels
 - > Errors introduced online, as codeword passes through channel
 - Channel can only remember t bits
 - > Modeled as branching program with width 2^t
 - > t = O(log n) captures every channel I can think of...
 - > t=n:"online channels" [Langberg], known to be quite powerful
- Can we achieve Shannon capacity?

Conclusions

 Models for achieving maximum transmission rates in binary channels, despite uncertain or adversarial channel behavior

- Perspective, tools from cryptography / derandomization
 - > Disciplinary lines are artificial
 - Crypto / information theory communities share many questions and techniques
 - > But also lots of ideas take time to cross over