



No. 1

Code-Based PKCs And Their Applications

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ICITS 2009

National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science PKCs can be divided into



No. 2

Number Theoretic (Cyclic) Problem

- Integer Factoring Based
 - RSA[RSA78]

and Technology AIST

- Rabin[Ra79]
- Okamoto-Uchiyama[OU98]
- Paillier[Pa99]
- S-Paillier[CHGN01]
- Discrete Logarithm Based
 - Diffie-Hellman[DH77]
 - ElGamal[El84]
 - ECC[Mi85][Ko87]
 - XTR[LV00]
 - Cramer-Shoup[CS03]
 - Kurosawa-Desmedt[KD04]

Combinatorial Problem Code Based

- McEliece[Mc78]
- Niederreiter[Ni86]
- Lattice Based
 - NTRU[HS96]
 - AjtaiDwork[AD97]
 - Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi [GGH97]
 - Ajtai[Ajt05]
 - Regev[Reg03,Reg05]
 - Peikert[Pei09]
- Subset Sum Based
 - Okamoto-Tanaka-Uchiyama[OTU00]



Cyclic Problem: Integer Factoring (IF)



Given a positive integer n, find its prime factor p_i

Equivalent to finding r s.t. g^r≡1 (mod n)
 for a g of GCD(g,n)=1 and g≢±1 (mod n)
 Since GCD(g^{r/2}-1,n) or GCD(g^{r/2}+1,n) is p_i

gⁱ mod n IF

This cycle can be determined in poly time with 1D-QFT, a.k.a. Shor's quantum algorithm.

QFT : Quantum Fourier Transform



Cyclic Problem: Discrete-Log (DL)




Given p, g and y, find r s.t. $x \equiv g^r \mod p$ p: prime, g: generator of Z_p*, x a member of Z_p* except 1, p-1. **Equivalent to finding** a_0 , a_1 , b_0 and b_1 s.t. $x^{a_0}g^{b_0} \equiv x^{a_1}g^{b_1} \mod p$ Since $x^{(a_1-a_0)} \equiv g^{r(a_1-a_0)} \equiv g^{(b_0-b_1)} \mod p$ $r \equiv \frac{(b_0 - b_1)}{(a_1 - a_0)} \mod p - 1$ DL a_0 This inclination can be determined in poly time x^ag^bmod p a_1 with 2D-QFT, a.k.a. Shor's quantum algorithm. No. 4





Lesson to learn





If a problem is written in the form of determining a cycle,
Then it can be solved in polynomial time using a quantum computer.


















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To reduce combinatorial problems to a cyclic problem

- The best attack on combinatorial problem is:
 - Grover's algorithm
- Grover's algorithm can reduce
 Running time to √states but it is still exponential to its input size



Advantages of Combinatorial Based



Quantum Tolerant:

No polynomial time algorithm is known so far even on quantum computers

Arithmetic unit is small:

- for encryption (and signature verification)
- Usually xors or additions in a small Field/Ring
- They are highly parallelizable
- No heavy multi-precision modular exponentiation



Advantages of Code-Based




No. 14

is better

Information Ratio, i.e. (Plaintest Size) (Ciphertext Size)

Arithmetic unit is smaller:
 for encryption and signature verification
 Usually xors

=> Suitable for low computational power or Ubiquitous devices








Green Letters: Underlying Liner Code

- : Attack
- : Already Broken
- Not Yet Broken
 (as far as I know as of Dec. 2009)



History of Non PKE Code-Based Primitives









Construction of Code-Based PKCs









Random Permutation Matrix Secret key n **Non-Singular Matrix** Ρ S G k Generator matrix of ECC which can correct up to t-error symbols Public key May be systematic if an $G^{\prime\prime}$ G′ appropriate IND-CCA2 conversion is applied No. 19



Encryption of Primitive McEliece PKE

Ζ




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C=MG'+Z

Plaintext is a k dimensional vector over GF(2)

Μ



Random vector with weight t




Decryption of Primitive McEliece PKE




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
P-1

■ 1. CP⁻¹=MSG+ZP⁻¹



 2. Correct the t-error bits using errorcorrection algorithm and obtain MS
 3. M=MS S⁻¹








Encryption of Primitive Niederreiter PKE



Ciphertext

C=ZH'

Plainstext is an n dimensional vector of weight t






Decryption of Primitive Niederreiter PKE



S⁻¹
 Correct the t-error bits using error-correction algorithm and obtain ZP
 3. Z=ZP P⁻¹

1. CS⁻¹=ZH'S⁻¹=ZPH SS⁻¹=(ZP)H





Unfortunately



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Due to the simple structure of a linear code, a lot of practical attacks are known

- This is the reason why some people still think that code-based PKEs have already been broken
- Ex.)

Reaction attack can decrypt a given ciphertext in O(k).



Reaction Attack on McEliece PKC



Flip one bit of the given ciphertext Let the receiver decrypt it If its reaction is normal, error is within the error correction bound. Receiver (decryption oracle) 01100010101101 C =Given ciphertext Reaction







Attacks


- Using decryption oracles
- Against indistinguishability or nonmalleability
- Can be prevented applying an "appropriate" conversion scheme
 - Naïve application sometimes does not work





Naïve application of OAEP is vulnerable








Slight Modification Makes it Provably Secure and Compact








Decryption of Conversion



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In The Case of Niederreiter



Make the ciphertext most compact and provably secure in the RO OAEP+ for short plaintext OAEP++ for long plaintext No proof but no attack SAEP+ Insecure (since Niederreiter primitive is position-wise malleable) SAEP



Provable Security in the Standard Model



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 2007: IND-CPA in the standard model [NIK+07]
 2008: IND-CCA2 in the standard model

[DQN08]

IND: Indistinguishability CPA: Chosen Plaintext Attack CCA2: Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack



Secure Constructions are Available



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As long as the primitive McEliece/Niederreiter PKC satisfies OW-CPA

Parameters meeting OW-CPA against most powerful attacks ISD and GBA are estimated in [FS09]

OW-CPA: One-Wayness against Chosen Plaintext Attack ISD: Information Set Decoding GBA: Generalized Birthday Attack



Parameters for PKE



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m					Plaintext /Ciphertext size		
1			factor	(KB)	McEliece	Niederreiter	
1	1	32	286.8	72.9KB	1696/2048 bits	233/352bits	
1	2	41	2 ^{128.5}	216.5KB	3604/4096 bits	327/492bits	

Public-key size is large compared to Number Theoretic ones.

National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology AIST			Parameters for Digital Signature				
m	t	Binary work factor	PK size (KB)	Iteration *1	Signature Size *2,*3		
22	9	2 ^{81.7}	101,371KB	2 ^{18.5}	198~216.5 bits		
15	12	2 ^{81.5}	716.0KB	2 ^{28.8}	180 \sim 208.8 bits		
14	13	2 ^{80.7}	360.0KB	2 ^{32.5}	182~214.5 bits		
13	14	2 ^{80.0}	178.0KB	2 ^{36.4}	182~218.4 bits		
12	15	2 ^{88.2}	86.0KB	240.3	180~220.3 bits		

*1: affects the signing cost

*2: Signature size depends on how to express the error pattern and it affects the verification speed.


*3: Signature size can be reduced further by removing some error positions while increasing the verification cost further [CFS01] No. 35








Increase the error correction capability Capacity Approaching Codes LDPC, QC-LDPC List Decoding corrects only a couple of more errors for practical parameters while increasing the decoding complexity Compress the public-key Quasi-Cyclic X Quasi-Dyadic Small extension degree \mathbb{S} Large extension degree \bigcirc No. 36





Since # of candidates C(n-k,w) where w is the Hamming weight of h_1 (and also the possibility of being another low density matrix is negligible), H can be recovered.


If one uses this direction, they must find a good code of Middle Density (we call MDPC).







Exhaustive Search $\frac{1}{\left(t+t'\right)}$ Correct any t' more errors but with the complexity $\left(\frac{n-t'+1}{t+1}\right)^{t'} \ge \frac{\binom{n}{t'}}{\binom{t+t'}{t'}} \ge \left(\frac{n}{t+t'}\right)^{t'}$ 紁 慾 t+t' errors in the n coordinates Bernstein's List Decoding [Ber08] t' more errors in poly time where $n = 2^{m}$ $t' = n - \sqrt{n(n-2t-2) - t}$ $=2^{m}-\frac{2^{m}(1-r)}{m}-\sqrt{2^{m}\left(2^{m}-2\left(\frac{2^{m}(1-r)}{m}\right)-2\right)} \qquad t=\frac{(n-k)}{m}=\frac{2^{m}(1-r)}{m}$ No. 39









Increase the error correction capability Capacity Approaching Codes LDPC, QC-LDPC List Decoding corrects only a couple of more errors for practical parameters while increasing the decoding complexity Compress the public-key Quasi-Cyclic X Quasi-Dyadic Small extension degree \mathbb{S} Large extension degree \bigcirc No. 41








CA B B α A A В \mathcal{O} B





Advantage of Dyadic Matrix





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Dyadic Matrix and Goppa Codes



have an intersection over the extension field of GF(2) Goppa Codes **Public-Key** (More generally, **Dyadic Matrix** can be Alternant Code with compress large cardinality) ed!! No. 44




Goppa Codes and Cauchy Matrix



Binary Goppa code is the set of all $c = (c_0 \ c_1 \ \cdots \ c_{n-1}) \in GF(2)^n$ s.t. $S_e(X) \equiv \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \frac{c_i}{X - L_i} \equiv 0 \mod g(X)$

If $g(X) = \prod_{i=0}^{t-1} (z_i - x)$ where z_i and L_j are distinct it can be written



To Make It Dyadic (more generic than [MB09])

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


$\oplus \delta$ can be ap	plied		
to either of a	$\oplus \delta_{\gamma}$	$\oplus \mathcal{O}_3$	$\oplus \delta_2$
numerator, a	(H)	$\oplus \delta$	$\oplus \delta$ $\to \oplus \delta$
denominator or			
fraction		$\left \frac{1}{\pi} \frac{1}{I} \frac{1}{\pi} \right $	$\left \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$
Ψġ	$\begin{vmatrix} z_0 - L_0 & z_0 - L_1 \\ 1 & 1 \end{vmatrix}$	$\begin{vmatrix} z_0 - L_2 & z_0 - L_3 \\ 1 & 1 \end{vmatrix}$	$ \begin{vmatrix} z_0 - L_4 & z_0 - L_5 \\ 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 \\ \end{vmatrix} \begin{vmatrix} z_0 - L_6 & z_0 - L_7 \\ 1 & 1 \\ \end{vmatrix} $
$\oplus \delta_2 $	$\left \frac{1}{z_1 - L_0} + \frac{1}{z_1 - L_1} \right $	$\begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{z_1 - L_2} & \frac{1}{z_1 - L_3} \end{bmatrix}$	$\left[\begin{array}{ccc} 1 \\ \hline z_1 - L_4 \\ \hline z_1 - L_5 \end{array} \right] \left[\begin{array}{ccc} 1 \\ \hline z_1 - L_6 \\ \hline z_1 - L_7 \\ \hline z_1 - L_7$
(F)S	$\left \overline{z_2 - L_0} \overline{z_2 - L_1} \right $	$\overline{z_2 - L_2}$ $\overline{z_2 - L_3}$	$\left \begin{array}{c c} \overline{z_2 - L_4} & \overline{z_2 - L_5} \end{array} \right \left \begin{array}{c c} \overline{z_2 - L_6} & \overline{z_2 - L_7} \end{array} \right \right $
uq.			
$\oplus \delta_3$	$\left\lfloor \left\lfloor \overline{z_3 - L_0} \overline{z_3 - L_1} \right\rfloor$	$\begin{bmatrix} \overline{z_3 - L_2} & \overline{z_3 - L_3} \end{bmatrix}$	$ \left\lfloor \left\lfloor \frac{1}{z_3 - L_4} \frac{1}{z_3 - L_5} \right\rfloor \left\lfloor \frac{1}{z_3 - L_6} \frac{1}{z_3 - L_7} \right\rfloor \right\rfloor $
5	$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$	$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$	$\left[\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \right]$
⊕\$	$ z_4 - L_0 z_4 - L_1 $	$z_4 - L_2 z_4 - L_3$	$\begin{vmatrix} \frac{1}{z_4 - L_4} & \frac{1}{z_4 - L_5} \\ 1 & 1 \end{vmatrix} \begin{vmatrix} \frac{1}{z_4 - L_6} & \frac{1}{z_4 - L_7} \\ 1 & 1 \end{vmatrix}$
$\oplus \mathcal{O}_2$	$\begin{bmatrix} z_5 - L_0 & z_5 - L_1 \end{bmatrix}$	$\begin{bmatrix} \overline{z_5 - L_2} & \overline{z_5 - L_3} \end{bmatrix}$	$\begin{bmatrix} z_5 - L_4 & z_5 - L_5 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} z_5 - L_6 & z_5 - L_7 \end{bmatrix}$
-	$\left \left \begin{array}{ccc}1&1\end{array}\right \right $	1 1	
$\oplus \delta$	$\begin{vmatrix} z_6 - L_0 & z_6 - L_1 \end{vmatrix}$	$\begin{vmatrix} z_6 - L_2 & z_6 - L_3 \end{vmatrix}$	$\begin{bmatrix} \hline z_6 - L_4 & z_6 - L_5 \\ 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \hline z_6 - L_6 & z_6 - L_7 \\ 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$
	$\left \left \frac{1}{T} \right \frac{1}{T} \right $	$\left \frac{1}{I} \right \frac{1}{I}$	
L	$\left\lfloor \left\lfloor z_7 - L_0 z_7 - L_1 \right\rfloor\right\rfloor$	$\begin{bmatrix} z_7 - L_2 & z_7 - L_3 \end{bmatrix}$	$ \left\lfloor \left\lfloor z_7 - L_4 z_7 - L_5 \right\rfloor \left\lfloor z_7 - L_6 z_7 - L_7 \right\rfloor \right\rfloor $

National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology AIST Dyadic block then picks up

We propose to generate a small full Dyadic block and then generate other full Dyadic blocks by introducing ⊕ (we call it outer delta)

Whereas we call $\oplus \delta$ inner delta (since it defines the inner structure of a full Dyadic block









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Can generate the txn Dyadic matrix more flexibly,
 N=2^m can be closer to n+t
 Can remove the block-wise permutation and removal in key generation


Since they are already included by the parameter choice of $\bigoplus \Delta$







Block-Wise Permutation is the same as changing Δ_i's appropriately.
 Removal of one block is the same as reducing the number of blocks by one and then changing Δ_i's appropriately



$\overbrace{Advanced Industrial Science}_{Advanced Industrial Science} Advanced Industrial Science} \\ to the denominators \\ \hline b the denominator \\ \hline b the denom$

It is the two products of the equation of the equation is the equation of the equation is the equation of the equation is the equation is

 $z_0, L_0, \delta_1, \delta_2 \cdots \delta_{\log_2 t}, \Delta_1, \Delta_2 \cdots \Delta_{(n/t)-1} \in GF(2^m)$ are chosen at random while making all the z_i for $0 \le i < t$ and L_j for $0 \le j < n$ distinct.



Shuffle While Keeping Dyadic Structure



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With Column-Block-Wise Scalar Multiplication

 $\begin{bmatrix} Full \\ Dyadic \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} Full \\ Dyadic \end{bmatrix} \cdots \begin{bmatrix} Full \\ Dyadic \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ p_1 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} p_{1} \\ p_{2} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} p_{2} \\ p_{2} \end{bmatrix}$

where $p_i \in GF(q^m) \setminus \{0\}$ and $b = \frac{n}{t}$



 $GF(q^m)$ to GF(q)



 $\{\gamma_1, \gamma_2 \cdots \gamma_{m-1}\}$ is the $A, \gamma_i \in GF(q^m)$ $a_i \in GF(q)$ dual basis of $GF(q^m)$ $A = \begin{bmatrix} a_0 \\ a_1 \\ \vdots \\ a_{m-1} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} tr(\gamma_0 A) \\ tr(\gamma_1 A) \\ \vdots \\ tr(\gamma_{m-1} A) \end{bmatrix}$ $tr(A) = A + A^{q} + A^{q^{2}} + \dots + A^{q^{m-1}}$ No. 52



 $GF(q^m)$ to GF(q)



 b_0 a_0 b_{m-1} B a_{m-1} A a_0 \mathcal{O}_0 b_0 R a_0 A b_0 a_0 b_{m-1} a_{m-1} a_{m-1} b_{m-1} No. 53



Shuffle While Keeping Dyadic Structure



Multiplication of a Random Dyadic Matrix

 $\begin{bmatrix} Random \\ Dyadic \\ Random \\ Dyadic \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} Full \\ Dyadic \\ Dyadic \end{bmatrix}$

Note: Dyadic X Dyadic = Dyadic $\begin{bmatrix} A & B \\ B & A \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} C & D \\ D & C \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} AC + BD & AD + BC \\ BC + AD & BD + AC \end{bmatrix}$ No. 54




Attack on Quasi Dyadic [UL09]



Exploits the fact that each column of each low of H'^T is tr(f(L_i)) where f() and L_i are unknown

- If one can make f(x)=const, tr(f(L_i)) becomes independent of L_i and all the coordinates in the same block of the low take the same value.
- On the contrary, by choosing r_i s.t.

 $r_i H'^T = ([h_{i,0}, \cdots, h_{i,0}], [h_{i,1}, \cdots, h_{i,1}], \cdots, [h_{i,b-1}, \cdots, h_{i,b-1}])$ f(x) can be const with high probability_{No.55}









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m(m-1) unknown in GF(q) and hence the uncertainty of $(p_1 \text{ to } p_{m-1})$ is m(m-1) $1)\log_2 q$ bits E.g.) For q=2, by making m>=10, the uncertainty becomes >=90 bits and this attack can be avoided

(though this attack might be improved in future)



Parameters for PKE



1	m	t	Binary work	PK size	Plaintext /Ciphertext size			
0			factor	(KB)	McEliece	Niederreiter		
4	11	32	286.8	72.9KB	1696/2048 bits	233/352bits		
	12	41	2 ^{128.5}	216.5KB	3604/4096 bits	327/492bits		

↓ QD (Parameters are not optimized)

m	t	n	р		Binary work	PK size (KB)	Plaintext/Cip hertext Size
					factor		QD
16	64	2560	1	12	291.3	3.0KB	427/1024 bits
13	64	2048	2	16	290.2	1.9KB	406/832 bits
12	128	2400	1	8	290.7	1.3KB	716/1536 bits
							No. 58

Advanced In and Te	National Institute of dvanced Industrial Science and Technology AIST					
m	t	BWF		K size KB)	Iteration *1	Signature Size *2,*3
14	13	280.7		360.0KB	2 ^{32.5}	182~214.5 bits
13	14	280.0		178.0KB	2 ^{36.4}	182~218.4 bits
12	15	288.2		86.0KB	2 ^{40.3}	180~220.3 bits
	↓ Q[D (Par	amete	rs are n	ot optim	nized)
m	t	n	Binary work factor	PK size (KB)	Iteration *1	Signature Size *2,*3
15	12	26528	284.0	48.2KB	2 ^{32.5}	180~212.5 bits
14	13	13316	283.4	22.4KB	2 ^{36.4}	182~218.4 bits
13	14	6736	282.9	10.4KB	2 ^{40.3}	182~222.3 bits





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Suitable Applications for Code-Based PKCs




Code-Based PKCs Fit With Heterogeneous Network/Applications

D1






One side has high computational power



A lot of low cost and low computational power devices, such as RFIDs, sensors and SCADA devices

Since

Encryption and signature verification consist mostly of xors and they are highly parallelizable.
They do not require heavy multi precision modular exponentiations



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
a lot of (lightweight) receivers receive it and check its authenticity and data integrity.



In emergency applications, low latency is crucial







In some cases, a few seconds are enough to mitigate serious damages, and hence delay is should be minimized while maintaining adequate security level.

Comparison Among Solutions



	MAC with one master key	MAC with pair- wise keys	TESLA (hash- chain and delayed auth)	Digital Sig Conventio nal (RSA, DSA, ECDSA)	gnatur
Authenticity and Data Integrity	X*1	0	0	0	
Computational Cost	0	0	0	Х	
Delay	0	X*2	X*3	Х	

*1: Crack of one device breaks it.

National Institute o

Advanced Industrial Science and Technology

AIST

*2: Sender must broadcast a lot of MACs and each device must wait until his MAC is received.

*3: Verification key is released in the next time slot.

TESLA: Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication

No. 65

Comparison Among Solutions



	MAC with one master key	MAC with pair- wise keys	TESLA (hash- chain and delayed auth)	Digital Sig Conventio nal (RSA, DSA, ECDSA)	nature Code- Based
 Authenticity and Data Integrity	X*1	0	0	0	0
Computational Cost	0	0	0	Х	0
Delay	0	X*2	X*3	Х	

*1: Crack of one device breaks it.

National Institute o

Advanced Industrial Science and Technology

AIST

*2: Sender must broadcast a lot of MACs and each device must wait until his MAC is received.

*3: Verification key is released in the next time slot.

TESLA: Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication

No. 66





Privacy Enhanced RFID




No. 67

RFID: a tag used for reading/writing ID (and information) via wireless communication.





Applications: management of items, e.g. in supply chain





Solutions Can Be Divided Into



No. 69

Tag disabling solutions

- Manually removal or destruction
- Kill command
- Temporally tagdisabling solutions
 - Faraday cage
 - Access password
 - Hash lock
 - Blocker tag
 - Mode switch

Tag enabling solutions

- Randomized hash lock [WSRE03]
- HB+ [JW05] and its variants
- Code-Based Unlinkable-ID [SKI06] [CKM+07]

Tag enabling solutions: Enable RFID functionalities while providing unlinkability of IDs




Comparison



No. 70


	Exhaustive search of IDs at the server	Unlinkability
Randomized hash lock, HB+ and its variants	Necessary (Tag identification cost depends on # of tags)	0
Code-Based Unlinkable-ID	Unnecessary (Tag identification cost is independent of # of tags)	0




Code-Based Unlinkable-ID:


$$m = \frac{n_{1} / n = t_{1} / t}{V_{H}(r) = t_{1} + W_{H}(d) = t_{2}} = t_{1} + t_{2}$$

(random num.) (ID)









This scheme provides unlinkability of IDs against passive attack. But by make this challenge-response type, this can also be secure against adaptive attack [CKM+07]



Conclusion (1/2)



No. 74

Code-based PKCs are suitable for
 Heterogeneous Network/Applications, such as

 Broadcast Authentication and Unlinkable-ID
 for light weight devices such as

 RFID, sensors, SCADA devices

 Since they

 do not require heavy multi-precision modular

- ao not require heavy multi-precision modular exponentiation
- can be executed mostly using only xors highly in parallel



Conclusion (2/2)



Research themes left in this area include
Further reduction of PK sizes
New attacks (especially on QD)
New primitives/applications
Implementation and side-channel attacks
Provable security
etc.





No. 76

Thank you very much for your kind attention!!





No. 77

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